Accountant’s Summary
 It was not improper for the court to rely on petitioner husband’s exhibits which were an account’s summary of various documents; where original documents were voluminous and could not conveniently be examined to extract the fact to be proved, then any competent witness who had seen the originals, such as an accountant, could testify to the fact, provided it was capable of being determined by calculation.  In addition, the documents summarized had to be available in court or made available to the opponent.  In re Westcott
Affidavits
 The use of affidavits to aid a court in determining property settlement and maintenance awards is not improper.  In re Johnson

Court’s Discretion
 A court does have the discretion to order the establishment of a trust for a child’s future educational expenses while he or she is of minority age if there is evidence showing a need to protest the interests of the child.  In re Harsy
Disbursement of Proceeds
 Provision in educational trust providing for disbursement of trust proceeds to respondent-husband’s adult children upon termination of trusts was not allowed.  In re Harsy
Future Expenditures
 The trial court could impose a trust for future expenditures for the children’s college educations even though there was no evidence that the children would even attend college upon becoming of age to do so.  In re Harsy
Necessary
 The establishment of the trust funds for respondent-father’s children’s future educational needs was necessary to promote and protect the minor children’s interest, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it so ordered where the evidence revealed that the respondent was of the opinion that further education was not something to be valued, and because of his opinion, it could be inferred that he would not take measures to assure that there would be funds available for that purpose.  In re Harsy
No Abuse of Discretion
 Where there was evidence in the record that respondent father had upon one occasion been held in contempt of court for failing to pay his child support as ordered by the court, which indicated that the respondent had either been unable or unwilling to pay, order that respondent establish educational trusts for his minor children for the purpose of paying their college expenses was not an abuse of discretion.  In re Harsy

 Appellate court erred in holding that the trial courts should have considered the husband’s expected Social Security benefits in dividing the wife’s pension benefits in their divorce case as the Social Security Act expressly barred use of a Social Security benefits to divide or offset other benefits in state divorce proceedings.  In re Marriage of Crook
 Under this section, the legislature provided for an equitable division of property after consideration is given to certain relevant factors, and Illinois courts have held that an equitable division need not be an equal one.  In re Woodward

 Taking into account, inter alia, the 30 year marriage, petitioner’s role in raising seven children and as homemaker to the family unit, and her limited opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income, an equal division of marital property was an appropriate exercise of discretion.  In re Smith
 The facts warranted an equal distribution of property where the wife made major contributions as a homemaker during the couple’s 34 year marriage, including gardening, canning, and packaging of the meat, raising 14 children and managing the household.  In re Reed
Illustrative Cases
 Following her ex-husband’s early retirement as a teacher, the ex-wife was ordered to pay her proportionate share of the contributions necessary for the ex-husband to qualify for early retirement benefit enhancements, and in return, the ex-wife received her awarded share of the benefits.  In re Marriage of Ramsey
 Where wife had substantial non-marital property, earned more income, and had a greater opportunity to acquire assets and income in the future than husband, the application of the statutory factors to the facts of the present case mandated a finding that award of only $62,070 of the net marital estate of $274,006 to husband did not constitute and equitable award of property.  In re Forbes
 An award of the marital resident and furnishing to a plaintiff was justified under former section 18 of the Divorce Act (see now this section) where the residence, home furnishing and the business were all jointly owned assets, and an approximately equal division of the assets in common best satisfied the interest of both parties.  The award of the business to the defendant and the award of the equity in the residence and household furniture to plaintiff resulted in an approximately equal division of the assets.  Hulslander v. Hulslander

 The court erred in that part of its decree which divested appellant of her title, as joint tenant with appellee, in the two pieces of real estate, where the proof showed that appellant worked about nine hours a day as bookkeeper and office manager of the motor sales business to two months after she and appellee were married until they separated, and that she received no pay for her labor, and that this property had been purchased out of the proceeds of the business, and that it was deeded to appellant and appellee as joint tenants.  Arliskas v. Arliskas

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 Subsection (d) of this section is the only statutory provision which authorizes the trial court to divide the assets of a marriage; it provides for disposition of property pursuant to a dissolution proceeding or an action to declare a marriage invalid.  In re Lipkin
Stock
 Trial court’s finding that stock was acquired in exchange for property acquired before marriage was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  In re Wilder
Tax Consequences
 Requiring one party to bear the tax consequences of a division of property, where requirement may have resulted in an unequal division of property, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  In re Miller
 Award to wife of a majority of marital assets plus exclusive possession of marital home for five years, with credit for all reduction in principal of the mortgage, was not an abuse of discretion even though award granted spouse exclusive possession of the marital residence when there were no minor children.  In re McNeeley
 
 

Vacation Trips
 Taking vacation trips with someone other than the spouse has been held to constitute dissipation.  In re Murphy
Conduct in Accepting Terms
 In divorce proceeding, wife’s conduct in accepting a quitclaim deed, $6,000, and the payment of attorney fees to her amounted to an acceptance of the benefits of the decree and was a release of errors.  Kissin v. Kissin
Date
 It is the date of dissolution and not the date of the parties’ separation that the determinative as to what property was acquired during a marriage.  In re Tatham
Provisions of Decree
 For the provisions of the divorce decree to be a bar to the husband’s claim to co-ownership with wife of property, it would be necessary to establish that the matter was an issue in the divorce proceedings, since any adjudication, to constitute a bar, must have been on what was actually in issue.  Szczurak v. Veitschegger
Fairness
 The fairness of the distribution of marital assets cannot be dealt with on a piecemeal basis, but the distribution as a whole must be considered to determine if the distribution of the assets was made in just proportions as required by the statute.  In re Steele
 A disposition of property is not unfair merely because a party is unhappy with it.  In re Borg
Fund
 Unallocated maintenance and an award of attorney fees are proper distributions from a fund set up for child’s benefit under this section.  In re Gocal
Greater Financial Contributions
 Greater financial contributions by one spouse alone will not automatically entitle that spouse to a greater distributive share of the marital assets.  In re Cecil
Inventory
 A trial court did not abuse its discretion in separating inventory from the business for the purpose of determining marital and non-marital property.  In re Pancner
Marital Home
 Where the spouse awarded possession became exclusively obligated to pay mortgage installments, real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance and upkeep, possession of the marital home should not have been considered as additional child support.  In re Theeke
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 Division of marital assets, totaling $189,000, by allocating to wife total assets valued at $112,400 and to husband total assets valued at $76,600, would be upheld, where the trial court considered the length of the marriage, wife’s age and education, her employment background and absence from the labor market for more than 32 years, and fact that husband was a professional, earning a substantial income with a greater opportunity to acquire capital assets and additional income.  In re McNeeley
 Division of property was supported by the evidence.  In re Carini 
 If a property distribution resulted in substantially equal shares for both parties and it was apparent from the record that the court thoughtfully and carefully applied the rationale of the statue to the award will not be disturbed on review.  In re Reed 
 Where parties were married for 21 years, wife was a recovered alcoholic and at the time of the hearing she was attending beauty school, husband was awarded a $20,000 interest in marital home worth approximately $110,000 and he had an annual salary of $33,000 per year at the time of the hearing, the trial court’s division of the marital property was equitable.  In re Rogers
 A 60% - 40% division of marital estate, omitting tax consequences, was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion where husband was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion where husband contributed more in the acquisition, preservation and appreciation in value of the marital estate.  In re McMahon
 
 

Trial court did not err in its division of property favoring the husband where the evidence showed that wife was 61 years old, employed and earning slightly under $25,000 per year, husband was 68 years old and disabled, respondent’s only income was a $446 monthly social security benefit and there was no evidence in the record indicating that wife was not in good health.  In re Benefield
 Award of marital home to former wife in marriage dissolution action did not constitute a clear abuse of discretion because former wife had custody of three minor children.  In re Sheber
 Where the trial court found that respondent husband’s contribution to parties’ asset accumulation was negated by his dissipation of these same assets, this fact justified an award of a larger percentage of the assets to petitioner wife enven though courts have found it equitable to apportion property accumulated during longer marriages in equal proportions; thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  In re Smith
 While the trial court did not state relevant factors it considered in making division, after reviewing record and the factors found in subsection (c) of this section to be considered in the division of marital property, the apportionment of marital property did not constitute an abuse of discretion.  In re Shafer
 Where petitioner received approximately 75% of the marital property, including two homes owned by the parties, respondent retained possession of non-marital real property totaling 60 acres and containing tillable land, a lake, and two dwellings, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding petitioner a greater share of the marital assets; moreover, the distribution effectuated by the trial court was further justified by the vast difference in the future earning capacities of the parties because respondent needed only to compete a dissertation to obtain a doctorate in educational administration, while petitioner had only a high school education and thus, respondent had vastly greater opportunity for the future acquisition of assets and income, and the court properly relied on this fact in dividing the marital property.  In re Stephenson

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 A finding of dissipation is possible even though the dissipating party did not derive personal benefit from the dissipation of the asset.  In re Frey
 The dissipating party need not derive a personal benefit from the dissipation in order to be held accountable; for example, a spouse’s failure to make mortgage payments and prevent foreclosure on a family home, which results in a loss of equity therein, can constitute dissipation.  In re Jones
 A finding of dissipation is possible even though the dissipating party did not derive personal benefit from the dissipation of the asset.  In re Petrovich

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